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Lessons from the Balkans for American Foreign Policy: Building
Civil Society within a Multilateral Framework
Henry H. Perritt, Jr.*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The end of the Cold War left the world without a structure of international
relations. The first Bush Administration briefly flirted with the vague idea of a New
World Order. The Clinton Administration pursued a policy of selective intervention
with an emphasis on development of civil society and human rights, as in Bosnia and
Kosovo. The second Bush Administration came to office preaching disengagement,
unilateral pursuit of US interests, suspicion of multilateralism, preoccupation with
threats from China and Russia, and a determination to implement an unproven
national missile defense system.
In the war on terrorism, the Bush Administration arranged a broad coalition of
states to assist in responding to the attacks of September lth through military
intervention in Afghanistan. But aside from driving the Taliban from power in
Afghanistan and catching Osama Bin Laden, what shall be the course of this ware
This essay, drawing on my involvement in the Balkans, suggests a strategy of
engagement for US foreign policy, below and beyond the nation-state level. The
United States must build civil society, rule of law, democracy, and open markets in
countries that now breed terrorism, and develop a military capability to meet actual
threats within a multilateral context.
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II. EXPERIENCE IN THE BALKANS
Beginning six years ago, I organized and led two projects-Project Bosnia and
operation Kosovo-which sent law students to the Balkans for one to six weeks.
These students' accomplishments included aiding the Bosnian Ombudsman and
Constitutional Court in obtaining US and international funds to acquire computers
and connecting the International Media Center in Banja Luka, Bosnia to the Internet.
They provided technical assistance to the Property Commission in Bosnia and
developed plans to reduce an enormous backlog of claims by victims of ethnic
cleansing. They helped the Minister of Science and Technology in Croatia write a
law for regulation of the Internet; provided assistance to lawyers in Macedonia who
wanted to establish a bar association; and aided in the development of a plan for an
Internet-based legal information infrastructure for Albania.
These students are continuing to work with young professionals in Kosovo and
Albanian diaspora groups in Europe and the US to establish a Washington presence
to assist the Kosovo chamber of commerce in attracting foreign capital into small and
medium enterprises in Kosovo. The students also helped all the major political parties
in Kosovo adopt sound market-oriented economic development policies and assisted
Kosovar political candidates in gaining access to advice on how to conduct democratic
political campaigns.
These students did not work alone. Often, the students supplemented the
American Bar Association's Central and East European Law Initiative ("CEELI"),
which assigns hundreds of lawyer-volunteers for one to two years to help build ruleof-law institutions in former socialist countries. They worked closely with local Soros
Open Society Institute centers on Internet connectivity, the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, and the United Nations Mission in Kosovo.
Other groups were also involved in the Balkans. Such efforts werejust the tip of
the iceberg. Non-governmental organizations ("NGOs") held coordination meetings
in Sarajevo and Pristina attended by nine hundred different organizations involved in
humanitarian and civil society work.
We learned important lessons from Project Bosnia and Operation Kosovo. A
few dozen American law students can achieve tangible results in building civil society
in places that many Americans think are hopeless. My students successfully
encouraged entrepreneurs to build high-tech businesses, induced new political leaders
to adopt sound economic development plans, and got new legal institutions off to a
good start. We learned that it is within America's capacity to assist in building civil
society.
III. AMERICAN INTERESTS
The threats to America's interests in the twenty-first century are fundamentally
different from those in the twentieth. In the twentieth century, threats proceeded
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from essentially state-based extension of power over geography, reinforced by
ideology. Although geopolitical factors have not disappeared from the international
equation, most twenty-first century threats arise from a failure of states to channel
and contain the forces of reaction to modernity, including globalization. Terrorism
arises from that failure. Protection of American interests cannot succeed without a
sophisticated understanding of these failures and a strategy aimed at overcoming the
failures and, in the meantime, blunting the forces of reaction.
America must be engaged with the rest of the world to accelerate the
construction of civil society and to support multilateral frameworks for trade,
international law, peacekeeping, and, when appropriate, military intervention.
A. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS INVOLVES MORE THAN
SOVEREIGN STATES

Historically, foreign policy proceeded from two assumptions: military capability
must aim at opposing and defeating armies directed by states; and diplomacy is
defined by relations among states. Now states are only one among several types of
international actors. The central conceptual challenge of the war on terrorism is to
deal with this reality. Winning a war against al Qaeda is not at all the same as driving
Iraq from Kuwait.
In this century, political power is diffused above and below the state level. States
cede a measure of sovereignty upward in a complex framework of intergovernmental
organizations, such as the World Trade Organization, and the institutions of the
European Union. They also exercise power constrained by diffusion of political power
into sub-state private groups such as NGOs, and militant organizations such as the
Kosovo Liberation Army, al Qaeda, Hamas, and Hezbollah. New information
technologies, including the Internet, open up new channels for political interaction,
both domestically and across national boundaries. At the same time, other
technological advances place powerful new weapons-antiaircraft missiles and
biological weapons-into the hands of individuals and groups.
No foreign policy or national security strategy can be effective if it blindly focuses
on the actions of states.
B. ENGAGEMENT IN BUILDING CIVIL SOCIETY

Societies in which education is available but opportunities are not, are breeding
grounds for extremism. Creating opportunities for participation in public life and
economic activity will enhance political stability and reduce the allure of religious
extremism for new generations.2
2.

See generally Thomas L. Friedman, Foreign Affairs; Today's News Quiz, NY Times A19 (Nov 20,
2001).

Spring2002

CbicagoJournalof Internationa(Law

Such opportunities arise only when progress is made toward rule of law, civil
society, and market competition. Progress requires many different kinds of
institutions: courts and judiciaries, independent political parties, judges and bar
associations; analogs of parent-teacher associations, leagues of women voters, veterans
of foreign wars, rotary clubs, and alumni associations appropriate for local cultures;
ministries of culture and education, trade promotion agencies, chambers of commerce,
trade associations and trade unions. Private associations perform important political
mediation functions between political authority and competing ideological and
economic interests. Civil society also provides pathways of participation for those with
ambition.
Because the existence of these institutions of civil society often is outside the
tradition of countries in transition, US foreign policy should explicitly utilize all the
tools available to assist in developing such institutions. My experience in the Balkans
focused on building institutions that provided constructive pathways for the
ambitions of a new generation that otherwise might have been tempted by extremism
and violence.
C. ENGAGEMENT OF MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS FOR TRADE,
PEACEKEEPING, AND MILITARY INTERVENTION

In 1997, Richard Haas wrote a book entitled The Reluctant Sheriff. The title
signifies that the United States (the sheriff) finds itself in the position of having to
build coalitions (the posse) in order to overcome threats to world peace and security.
While the United States is the preeminent military power, it needs participation by
other states to act effectively.
My 1998 review of Haas's book embraced the sheriff and posse metaphors,
while arguing that the metaphors necessitate attention to the role of international law
and multilateral institutions. The sheriff in the Old West had to persuade the public.
A posse, whether or not organized by the sheriff, was a lynch mob unless there was a
court-issued writ authorizing its formation and activity. Similarly, international law
plays a major role in legitimizing the modern form of an international posse. In the
war in Afghanistan, support for Security Council resolutions helped build the
supporting coalition; in the war in Kosovo, the absence of unambiguous Security
Council authority undercut support for the NATO bombing campaign.
US foreign policy must work within a multilateral legal framework, as it has for
the last sixty years.

3.

Henry H. Perritt, Jr., 26 Syracuse J Intl L & Comm 95 (1998) (reviewing Richard N. Haas, The
Reluctant Sheriff.The United States After the Cold War (Council on Foreign Relations 1997)).
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1. Human rights
The human rights movement lies at the core of the transformation of
international law from a regime that focused entirely on the relationships among
states into a regime that focuses on the relationship between states and natural
persons. The United States should continue to embrace the human rights movement,
shaping it so that it focuses on the realm of the possible, rather than overreaching its
capacity to enforce its norms.
The International Criminal Court can be a useful addition to the human rights
apparatus, as demonstrated by the use of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia ("ICTY").4
2. Pursue free trade with a sensitivity to human concerns
Expansion of international trade and reductions in trade barriers are good policy.
Increasing the flow of goods and services, labor, and capital across national boundaries
enhances economic opportunity within national boundaries, reducing the frustrations
that breed extremism and terrorism. In Kosovo, for example, a new generation with
strong entrepreneurial instincts seeks to study in the West and return to Kosovo.
These young Kosovars desire access to private Western capital and Western markets
for goods and services produced by new enterprises in Kosovo.! Reducing trade
barriers is an important tool in building civil society.
Immigration reform is also important. The United States must make more
accommodations for those in other parts of the world who want to study or work in
America or become Americans. Many who came to the US from Kosovo and Bosnia
desire to return to their homelands once they have the skills and capital to succeed in
their countries of origin.
3. UN
The United Nations is a symbol of the potential of multilateral cooperation.
Despite its deficiencies, the UN has made marked progress under the leadership of
Secretary General Kofi Annan and Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, working to
bridge differences between the organization and the American right, represented by
Senator Jesse Helms.
Building on experience in Kosovo (which in turn built constructively on the
post-Dayton Accords experience in Bosnia), the UN's initial work in organizing the
reconstruction of Afghanistan has been promising. The UN involvement in
rebuilding Bosnia was hesitant at first, lacking focus, but it grew stronger over time. A
4.

See, for example, Patricia Wald, Judging War Crimes, 1 Chi J Ind L 189, 191-92 (2000) (asserting
that the ICTY helps fill gaps in international law and to memorialize the factual story of what
happened).

5.

See generally Henry H. Perritc, Jr., Stabilizing Kosovo: EnterpriseFormation and FinancialMarkets, 2 J
Global Fin Mkts 28 (Summer 2001).
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stronger mandate for Kosovo, reposing de facto sovereignty in the UN Mission in
Kosovo as a kind of trustee, produced better results.
The United States should reaffirm its commitment to the UN and continue to
strengthen the organization's ability to deal with new problems of terrorism and the
construction of civil society.
D. BROKER A MIDDLE EAST PEACE SETTLEMENT INFORMED BY A
VISION OF THE FUTURE

The Balkan experience also can inform Middle East policy. In the Balkans and
the Middle East, the problems appear(ed) intractable. In both, US involvement is
essential; careful attention to civil society is appropriate.
The centerpiece of US policy in the Middle East must be an unequivocal
commitment to Israel's right to exist within secure and recognized borders. Israel's
long-term security depends on a viable political settlement.
Good mediation always is informed by an understanding of what happens in the
long run. The United States must have in mind scenarios for economic development
in any new Palestinian entity, so that short-term ceasefires do not collapse in the
reality of hopelessness for masses of potential terrorists. And the United States must
focus on a new generation of leadership for the Palestinian community.
Here, also, the Kosovo experience can be helpful. Any new Palestinian entity
will be confronted by some of the same challenges Kosovo faced after the withdrawal
of Serbian forces-ambiguity about sovereignty; the presence of large numbers of
loosely organized armed young people, only vaguely distinguished from the general
population; economic devastation; and uncertain prospects for economic progress in a
market context. The United States must guide a multilateral effort to build political
and economic structures in Palestine so that it no longer threatens Israel's existence.
IV.

CONTINUE TO LEAD THIS HEMISPHERE INTO DEMOCRACY AND
PROSPERITY

American foreign policy always has included a special regard for conditions in the
Western Hemisphere. Sustained American engagement, defined by pressure to open
up economic competition, to protect human rights, and to build the institutions of
democracy and civil society has produced much success in ending Latin America's
reputation as a collection of military autocracies.
Now, we have two important opportunities for refining and extending this policy
into the twenty-first century: Mexico and Argentina. Under the leadership of
President Vicente Fox, Mexico has experienced a peaceful political revolution. The
United States must continue to encourage political evolution in Mexico by embracing
new concepts for managing cross-border product, capital, and labor markets. We
must improve our understanding of how Mexicans in the United States interact with
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their communities of origin. The Mexican diaspora, like the Kosovar-Albanian
diaspora, can be a force for economic development if it is explicitly engaged.
Before its recent currency devaluation, Argentina was the model of a country
that takes American advice on reforming its economy. In many respects the advice was
beneficial. But, ultimately, underlying forces in the Argentinean economy brought the
experiment to an unhappy end. We must not only be fully engaged with Argentina's
government on steering a course through this crisis, but we must learn how to give
better advice in the future. Disengagement and indifference risk catastrophe.
A. DESIGN MILITARY AND NAVAL FORCE STRUCTURES TO
FACILITATE ENGAGEMENT

America must design its military and naval force structures to support
engagement in multilateral cooperation and building civil society. Clausewitz famously
observed that "war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition
of other means." Defense policy must be developed to serve foreign policy. One
worrisome trend in the United States is the tendency of the armed forces and their
advocates to constitute a separate interest group, suspicious of political leadership, and
separated from the mainstream of American society by ideological differences. Such a
cleavage is, in large part, a product of the Vietnam War and of the end to the draft.
Too many Americans have no experience with the military, and too many military
leaders have scant experience with other aspects of American life. This division is
dangerous in the long run. In the short run, it leads to an illogical distinction between
military missions defined by the Powell doctrine, and peacekeeping and nationbuilding activities, thought to be entirely outside the competence of the defense
establishment.
The attacks of September 11th appropriately stimulated more probing threat
assessments. We now understand a range of possible hostile actions threaten
American interests including state-based nuclear attacks against the continental US;
the primary threat during the Cold War conventional military attacks against US
interests or those of its allies, as in Iraq's invasion of Kuwait; terrorist attacks as on
September 11th; violence provoking political instability, as in Ireland or in Israel; and
political instability that boils over into violent revolution, as in Iran after the Shah fell.
Kosovo was a mixture, and the US thought itself poorly prepared to effectively
intervene.
National defense strategy must be based on a sophisticated understanding of
how the armed forces can respond effectively to each threat. We now understand that
threats to US security come not only from attacks launched by foreign states, but also

6.

Carl von Clausewitz, On War 605 (Princeton 1976) (Michael Howard and Peter Paret, ed and

trans) (commonly rendered as "war is the continuation of politics by other means").
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from armed groups like al Qaeda, and from sheer hopelessness in places like Ukraine,
which is driving newly independent states back into the arms of traditional protectors
like Russia.
Peacekeeping and war-fighting missions are not entirely distinct, but rather
overlap. The best force-structure and training approaches increase the overlap as
much as possible to avoid the need for two armies, one for peacekeeping and one for
fighting a war. The appropriate doctrine can increase the amount of overlap. For
example, peace enforcement doctrine can call for use of military forces only to secure
and pacify an area for a limited period of six months, and then to withdraw, with a
rapid-response capability if trouble overwhelms other forces. ("Other" forces must, of
course, exist.)
General Wesley Clark's book about the Kosovo conflict reveals that US military
leaders were reluctant to provide resources to win the campaign in Kosovo because
they wanted to protect options to fight hypothetical conventional wars in other parts
of the world. 7 Clark also discusses the reluctance of the US defense establishment to
reinforce the civil aspect of the peace accords in Bosnia.8 However, the armed services
have an important role to play in peacekeeping, nation-building, and anti-terrorism.
The United States should spend more money on training personnel to be effective
peacekeepers and adjuncts to building a civil society in places like Kosovo,
Afghanistan, East Timor, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Somalia.
B. PEACEKEEPING

American defense strategies must accommodate the need for peacekeeping and
peace enforcement. There is a valid distinction between military and police operations.
An international police force is a desirable tool; the US armed forces should not be
the only available tool when violence breaks out.
The mismatch between the forces available and the problems to be solved was
manifest in the reluctance of NATO commanders to move aggressively to arrest
indicted war criminals in Bosnia. It was also evidenced in the professed inclination of
US military leadership in Afghanistan to keep its distance from the UN- and
British-led initiative to establish an interim government and to rebuild Afghanistan.
The international community was slow to organize the police in Kosovo.
International police forces could be organized in a variety of ways. 9 NATO
provides one useful model. A permanent joint staff, like the one at NATO
7.
8.
9.

See General Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern War 313 (Public Affairs 2001).
See id at 100-06.
See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Policing International Peace and Security: InternationalPolice Forces, 17 Wis Intl
L J 281, 296-98 (1999) (options include augmenting existing United Nations Civilian Police
("UNCIVPOL"), training of reserve forces by individual states, and implementing a force consistent
with Article 43 of the UN Charter).
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headquarters, would prepare and update tactical plans, doctrine, training materials,
and technical standards for integrating police forces from different states. Police
commanders would be detailed to the joint staff with periodic in-service training.
Force components from different states would participate in joint training exercises.
C.

MISSTEPS IN MISSILE DEFENSE

Current proposals for a national missile defense system represent the wrong
approach to national security policy. They focus entirely on state-based threats, and
thus distract attention from sub-state phenomena; they exalt unilateralism and
weaken multilateral structures. The proposed national missile defense system involves
a multi-billion dollar commitment 0 to technology that does not work and is aimed at
a threat that is less important than terrorism and other sources of instability around
the world.
Withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty was ill-advised. Advanced
development and deployment of such a system risk destabilizing relationships with
China, Russia, and Europe, exacerbating proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
and setting off a new arms race.
V.

BUILD A PEACE CORPS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

The United States needs a new mandate for a Peace Corps for the twenty-first
century, to enlist young Americans to build civil society in countries in transition.
This new organization should enlist disaffected youth from target countries.
The logic supporting such an initiative is compelling. My experience from
Bosnia and Kosovo shows that small numbers of committed young people can make a
difference in helping to build the institutions of a rule of law, civil society, and market
economies. The work of the American Bar Association's CEELI project, work funded
by George Soros's Open Society Institute, and work done by "Business Volunteers" in
the Peace Corps, also provide models for what the United States should support on a
more explicit basis.
A new mandate for the Peace Corps would focus on recruiting volunteers
interested in building the institutions of a civil society. Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, and
Egypt come to mind as early targets, but obviously dozens more exist. The initiative
should be shaped to avoid adverse reaction to American cultural imperialism. A
regional approach might be useful, focusing efforts on "change agents," individuals (or
maybe institutions or even countries) that others in the community and society look
10.

For a recent study on the costs of deploying a national missile defense system, see Congressional
Budget Office, Estimated Costs and Technical Characteristicsof Selected National Missile Defense Systems
(CBO 2002), available online at
<htrp://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfinindex=3281&sequence=O&from=l> (visited Mar 24, 2002).
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to and trust. Once ideas and institutions take root in a region, they look more
"organic," and less threatening, to neighboring countries and peoples.
The Peace Corps should be clearly distinguished from military forces and the
Central Intelligence Agency. Operating through NGO contractors rather than
through US government employees may be more palatable in many places.
VI. EMBRACE NEW GEOPOLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES
Engagement in building civil society within states and pursuing American policy
within a multilateral context are not the complete answer to a sound American foreign
policy of course. We also must be open to larger geopolitical opportunities.

A.

SEEK REALIGNMENT WITH RUSSIA

The attacks of September 11th and reaction to them provide the best
opportunity since the Second World War for fundamental realignment of
relationships between Russia and the United States.
Three new realities frame this opportunity. First, America and Russia have a
common interest in opposing terrorism rooted in Islamic fundamentalism. Second,
the military operations in Afghanistan have led the United States to appreciate the
importance of South Asia far more than it did fifteen years ago when it armed the
Taliban and helped it run the Russians out, and then virtually abandoned the region.
Third, Russia's rich petroleum and natural gas reserves represent a potential solution
to US dependence on Middle East oil. If Russia comes to supply a greater portion of
US energy needs, an important new trade flow will link the countries economically, as
the US becomes a growing source of foreign exchange for Russia.
Apart from avoidance of major-power conflict, dealing successfully with smallerscale problems depends on the willingness of major powers to cooperate. Russia's
position was a crucial part of the political and military matrix for success in Kosovo.
B. ENGAGE CHINA
The evolution of China from a closed, authoritarian, ideological, and militaristic
society into one desiring economic development driven by market-oriented links to
the rest of the world provides opportunities to reduce security tensions in Asia.
Instead of viewing China as a military threat to the rest of the world, the United
States must reinforce the internal Chinese forces interested in modernization, while
reassuring China that its physical integrity is not threatened by openings to foreign
ideas and capital. Helping China build the institutions of a civil society are central to
such an approach.
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VII. CONCLUSION

John Bolton has it wrong. He concentrates on one type of power diffusion,
diffusion of power upward into multilateral institutions. He ignores the phenomenon
of diffusion of power into sub-state private groups, thus disregarding the more
important challenge to American interests. He views the human rights movement and
the evolution of treaty-based regimes in international law as threatening US
interests." He wants the United States to isolate itself from global civil society.
I suspect that Mr. Bolton applauds US interest in economic and political
development during the Cold War because it represented a policy approach that
would forestall Marxist tendencies in developing nations. Marxism was bad because it
tilted the balance of state power toward the Soviet Union and against the United
States.
Now, emphasis on development of civil society is appropriate because it forestalls
terrorist tendencies in developing nations. Not only is terrorism morally
reprehensible, but it also represents a sub-state force antithetical to US interests.
Rather than worrying about engagement bringing about global governance,
policymakers should recognize that engagement is the only way to protect long-term
US interests.

11.

See Bolton, 1 ChiJ Ind L at 221 (cited in note 1).
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